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Ernest E. Figari, Jr.*
M AJOR developments in the field of civil procedure during the survey
period include both judicial decisions and recent amendments to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.! This Survey will examine these developments
and consider their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
Several decisions during the survey period considered the propriety of out-
of-state service under article 2031b, the Texas long-arm statute. Section 3
of article 203 lb authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident when
he is "doing business" in Texas.' "Doing business," as defined by section 4,
includes entering into a contract by mail or otherwise with "a resident of
Texas" to be performed by either party in whole or in part in this state." The
reference to "a resident of Texas" has posed a perplexing problem for the
foreign corporation licensed to transact business in Texas that is seeking to
effect service upon a nonresident under article 2031b. Does the residency
requirement exclude from the definition of "doing business" the nonresident
defendant's contractual relations with the foreign corporation even though
the contract is to be performed in Texas? Or, is the licensed foreign corpora-
tion accorded the status of a Texas resident for purposes of article 2031b?
In a case of first impression, the court of civil appeals in National Truckers
Service, Inc. v. Aero Systems, Inc.' concluded that a foreign corporation
licensed to transact business in Texas enjoyed the same rights and privileges
as a domestic corporation,' and was, therefore, "a resident of Texas" as that
term is used in article 2031b.'
Article 2031b also authorizes service over former residents of Texas in
suits arising from their activities while domiciled in the state. Specifically,
section 6 provides that a person who becomes a nonresident of Texas after a
cause of action arises in this state and who "is not required to appoint a
service agent in this State" may be served through the secretary of state.!
Deviating slightly from the rule that a plaintiff must allege facts showing
that he is entitled to resort to the provisions for service under article 203 lb,
the court in Parnass v. L & L Realty Corp.' held that the plaintiff's petition
0 B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist
University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
' As a result of the amendments, 28 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were modified and
3 new rules were added. These changes became effective Feb. 1, 1973. See Civil Procedure
Rules Amended, 35 TEX. B.J. 1037 (1972).
2 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).31d. 3.4 1d. 4.
'480 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
Ild. at 458; see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (1956).
7480 S.W.2d at 458.
8 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 6 (1964).
"See McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965).10482 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error granted.
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need not allege that the defendant "is not required to appoint a service agent
in this State" to invoke section 6 of article 2031b." It is sufficient, reasoned
the court, if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant "has not appointed an
agent in state upon whom service may be made.
1
Parnass is also significant in two other respects. The defendant, seeking to
set aside a default judgment where service was made under article 2031b,
contended that jurisdictional allegations must be supported by evidence when
a defendant fails to appear and answer. Overruling this argument, the court
of civil appeals concluded that "proof is no more necessary to support juris-
diction allegations under article 2031b than to support allegations of the
authority of any other service agent before default judgment is rendered."'18
The defendant also maintained that where service is effected under article
2031b and no appearance is made, the record must show that the secretary of
state mailed process to the defendant. Relying upon the statutory duty of the
secretary of state to forward process to the defendant, the court held that
"[allthough the trial judge has discretion to require a certificate of mailing,
his failure to do so does not affect the validity of the judgment."'"
While earlier federal cases have opened the door to a broadened use of
article 2031b,8 the recent decision of a federal district court in Bland v.
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp." seems to have torn the door from its hinges.
The plaintiff brought suit against two corporate defendants, one a subsidiary
of the other, on a claim arising out of the alleged breach of a Texas contract
entered into between the plaintiff and the subsidiary corporation. The sub-
sidiary was served with process through its registered agent in Texas, but
service on the parent corporation, which was neither incorporated nor licensed
to do business in Texas, was effected under article 203 lb. The parent corpora-
tion filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plain-
tiff responded with the contention that the subsidiary "was a mere shell"
and that "the real party to the contract" was the parent." Although the par-
ent corporation owned ninety-five percent of the common stock of the sub-
sidiary, named three of the five directors of the subsidiary, and exercised in-
fluence and control over the business decisions of the subsidiary, the evidence
reflected that the defendants had gone to special lengths to preserve their
separate identities. Nevertheless, seizing upon the power of the parent cor-
poration to exercise control over its subsidiary, the federal district court con-
cluded that the activities of the subsidiary should be imputed to its parent for
jurisdictional purposes. Consequently, service on the parent under article 203 lb
was sustained. "
11 Id. at 946.
12 Id.
18 Id. at 948.
14 Id. at 949.
15 See, e.g., Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1969); Coulter v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 411 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969).10338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
1" Id. at 875.
18 The district court apparently harbored some reservations about its holding, as it cer-
tified the matter for interlocutory appeal, acknowledging that this "is a decision . . . as to




The rule has long prevailed in Texas that a contract which restricts the
situs of a suit to a particular county contravenes the statutory scheme for
fixing venue, and is unenforceable."9 The decisions of the court of civil appeals,
however, were in conflict as to whether venue choices could be increased by
an agreement of the parties.' This conflict was resolved by the Texas Supreme
Court in Fidelity Union Life Insurance Co. v. Evans,"' in which it was held
that the expansion of venue by contract is invalid except in such instances as
permitted by subdivision 5 of article 1995."
Subdivision 5 of article 1995 provides for an exception to exclusive venue
in a defendant's county of residence where the defendant has contracted in
writing to perform an obligation in a particular county. The Corpus Christi
court of civil appeals in Rost v. First National Bank' gave a liberal interpreta-
tion to subdivision 5 of article 1995 in determining the proper venue of a
suit brought on a written guaranty which did not specify where payments
under it were to be made. Upon default by the maker of a note, the guaranty
bound the defendants to discharge the note. Since the note was payable in the
county of suit, the court reasoned that subdivision 5 authorized suit against
the defendants in that county.
Rule 86," which prescribes the form of a plea of privilege, provides that
the plea shall state that the party claiming the privilege is not a resident of
the county in which the suit was instituted and that no exception to exclusive
venue in the county of residence exists. Nevertheless, a plea of privilege which
does not state that no exception to the exclusive venue in the county of
residence exists is not fatally defective. The court in Beyer v. Collinsworth'
held that this omission was cured when the evidence adduced at the venue
hearing showed that no exception to exclusive venue in the county of the
defendant's residence existed.
Several cases decided during the past year concerned the waiver of a plea
of privilege. Kohut v. Mrs. Baird's Bakeries, Inc.' emphasizes the danger of
taking any action inconsistent with the assertion of a plea of privilege prior
to a transfer of the case. In Kohut a defendant, who had unconditionally an-
swered to the merits and then requested a trial after the plea of privilege was
sustained, but before an order was entered, was held to have waived the right
to be sued in the county of its residence. A similar situation was involved in
"9International Traveler's Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630 (1919).
"'Compare Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 468 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1971), with Fort Worth Bd. of Trade v. Cooke, 25 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
See also Howard v. Barthold & Casey, 206 S.W. 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918);
Merchant's Reciprocal Underwriters v. First Nat'l Bank, 192 S.W. 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1917); Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Biggerstaff, 185 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1916).
1477 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1972).
'
2 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 5 (1964).
23472 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971).
24TEx. R. Civ. P. 86.
"5481 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972). But see Federal Land Bank v.
Downs, 127 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939).
29478 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972).
[Vol. 27
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
Thompson v. O'Donohoe,'7 but in Thompson the court ruled against a waiver
despite the fact that the defendant had filed in a single instrument a plea in
abatement and, "subject to the plea in abatement," a plea of privilege-
apparently because the defendant insisted only on his plea of privilege. In
Camden Oil Co. v. Hohman a waiver of a plea of privilege resulted from an
unusual set of events. The defendant had written to the clerk of the trial court,
enclosing both a motion to quash citation and a plea of privilege, and requested
that they be filed in that order. Despite the instructions, the clerk filed the plea
of privilege three minutes before the motion to quash. In considering a
waiver argument by the plaintiff, the court of civil appeals ignored the file
marks and regarded the motion and plea filed in the order requested by the de-
fendant. Noting that the motion to quash citation was not a special appear-
ance, the court concluded that the submission of the plea of privilege out of
the due order of pleading prescribed by rule 84' resulted in a waiver of the
plea.
Article 7.01 of the Insurance Code"0 attempted to fix the venue of suits on
private bonds in the county where the bond was filed. This statute was held
unconstitutional in Hayman Construction Co. v. American Indemnity Co."
The basis for the holding was the failure of article 7.01 to comply with the
constitutional requirement that the title of a legislative bill give reasonable
notice of its contents."'
III. PLEADINGS
Allright, Inc. v. Roper" demonstrates how an unwitting default can result
from the use of conditional pleadings. The plaintiff served process on a
representative of the defendant who was not authorized to accept process. The
defendant filed a motion to quash service and an answer which contained the
condition that "the Defendant intends to rely upon said answer, only in case
the foregoing Motion to Quash Service is overruled."' The motion to quash
was subsequently sustained and a few months later the plaintiff took a default
judgment against the defendant. Emphasizing that the grant of defendant's
motion to quash did not remove the defendant from the jurisdiction of the
trial court but merely extended the time for appearance and answer,' the
court concluded that the condition contained in defendant's answer was not
met, and therefore, the answer did not become operative so as to preclude the
entry of a default judgment.
IV. LIMITATIONS
Article 5539c " extends the limitation period for an additional thirty days
27482 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972).
28476 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972).
2
" TEx. R. Civ. P. 84.
20TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 7.01 (1963).
1473 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971).
2 TEx. CONST. art. III, 35.
11478 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
"' Id. at 246.
32 Id. at 247; accord. TEx. R. Civ. P. 122.1'uTEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539c (Supp. 1972). The statute was intended to
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on "a counterclaim or cross-claim" which otherwise would have been barred
by the applicable statute of limitation between the answer date and the time
the plaintiff filed his original petition, provided such claim arises out of the
same transaction upon which the plaintiff's suit is based. In a case of first
impression under the statute, the court of civil appeals in Smith v. Lone Star
Cadillac87 concluded that the extension provided for in article 5539c was
applicable to third party claims.
V. PARTIES
One of the most important decisions by the Texas Supreme Court in the
area of procedure during the last year was Commercial Travelers Life In-
surance Co. v. Spears.' Although arising in the context of discovery, the de-
cision turned on the propriety of a class action. At the instance of the plaintiff,
the trial court ordered discovery of the identity of the members of a class,
allegedly represented by the plaintiff, which consisted of persons who had been
denied coverage under hospitalization policies by the defendant insurance com-
pany on the same grounds as the plaintiff. Resisting the discovery, the de-
fendant brought an original mandamus proceeding in the supreme court.
According to the court, justification for the discovery depended solely upon
the propriety of the class action. Noting that the class suit was brought under
rule 42(a) (3) 3 and was of the "spurious" variety, the court concluded that
the class action was improper since the allegations of class interests and the
discovery resulting therefrom "added nothing to the cause of the class rep-
resentative" and "only served to invite the unnamed class members into the
litigation."' Apparently, a "spurious" class action will not be countenanced
in Texas unless there is substantial justification for its maintenance.
VI. DISCOVERY
In State v. Ashworth41 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether written
appraisal reports should be discoverable in a condemnation suit. Observing that
the reports were made subsequent to the events upon which the suit was based,
and in connection with the investigation and prosecution of such suit, the court
concluded that "[the written appraisal reports are not subject to discovery
under the clear language of Rule 167."' Shortly after the Ashworth decision,
however, rule 167 was amended to allow discovery of reports containing
"factual observations and opinions" of an expert, provided the expert is one
"who will be called as a witness."' Thus, it appears that the appraisal reports
considered in Ashworth are now subject to discovery.
change the result of cases such as Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91 S.W.2d 313(1936). See generally McElhaney, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24
Sw. L.J. 179, 192 (1970).
37470 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971).
38484 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1972).31TEx. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(3).
40484 S.W.2d at 579.
41484 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1972).
1Id. at 567.
4TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
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The question of whether illegally discovered evidence can be used in a civil
suit was recently considered in Day & Zimmermann v. Strickland." The trial
court refused to permit an expert witness for the defendant to testify to any-
thing he observed, or to any opinion he formed from his observation, during
an unauthorized inspection of the plaintiff's property. The court of civil ap-
peals concluded that the witness was a trespasser when he made the unau-
thorized entry and inspection, and that, under rule 167,' the defendant could
have asked the court to compel the plaintiff to permit an inspection of the
property. The court of civil appeals affirmed the action taken by the trial
court, and held that the "courts of this state will not admit testimony obtained
through the back door when there is provided a lawful method of entry
through the front door."46 Hopefully, Strickland is the long-awaited admoni-
tion that only legally obtained evidence will be received in a civil trial in this
state.
The new amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which became
effective February 1, 1973, made sweeping changes in the area of discovery.
Rule 167" has been substantially revised. Superseding the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in 1969 that liability insurance limits are not discoverable,'
rule 167 now permits discovery of any insurance agreement under which an
insurance company may be liable for all or a portion of the recovery sought
in the action. Rule 167 now also provides that any person, whether or not
a party, may request and obtain a copy of any statement he has previously
made concerning the suit, which is in the possession of a party. " As previously
mentioned, the new version of rule 167 authorizes discovery of written reports
containing "factual observations and opinions" of an expert, provided the ex-
pert is one who will be called as a witness."
Rule 167a,"1 which is completely new, empowers the trial court to order a
party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician on motion
"for good cause shown," where the physical or mental condition of such party
is in issue. The party submitting to the examination is entitled to receive a
copy of the examining physician's report. Upon delivery of the report, the
party who prompted the examination becomes entitled to receive a copy of
the report of any examination of the same condition, previously or thereafter
made at the instance of the party examined. If a physician fails or refuses to
make a report, the court may then exclude his testimony at the trial. In
the event no examination is sought, the party whose physical or mental con-
4483 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972), error ref. mr.e.
45TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
4"483 S.W.2d at 547; see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
(1965); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968). Contra, McColl v.
Hardin, 70 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934); Allison v. American Sur.
Co., 248 S.W. 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1923). See also Hartman v. Harder, 322
S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959). See generally Note, Constitutional Exclusion
of Evidence in Civil Litigation, 55 VA. L. REv. 1484 (1969).4
' TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
48 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1969).
41See also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (3).5 See notes 41-43 supra, and accompanying text. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4).
51 TEx. R. Civ. P. 167a. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
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dition is at issue may not comment to the jury on the failure of the opposing
party to seek or obtain such an examination.
Interrogatory practice under rule 168 "2 has undergone a substantial change
as a result of the new amendments. Now, a party may be required to state in
his answers the identity of each person he expects to call as an expert witness
at the trial and the subject matter of the expert's anticipated testimony.
Additionally, where the answer to an interrogatory may be ascertained from
records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served, the party
may answer the interrogatory by specifying the records and affording the
opposing party reasonable opportunity to examine and copy such records.
The responsibility to supplement answers submitted under rule 168 has also
been clarified. A party whose answers to interrogatories were complete when
made is now under a duty to amend or supplement his answers if he dis-
covers that the information given was incorrect. A broader duty to supplement
answers may be imposed by court order, agreement of the parties, or a request
for supplementation of prior answers. Another change in rule 168 should be
noted. The attorney for a party is no longer authorized to sign answers to
interrogatories.
The procedure relating to requests for admission of facts and genuineness
of documents under rule 169"' has been clarified by the recent amendments.
A party who requests admissions may now initiate an action to determine the
sufficiency of the answers or reasons for not admitting or denying the matter
requested. If the trial court determines that an answer does not comply with
the requirement of the rule, it may order that the matter is admitted or that
a corrected answer be served. The effect of an admission under rule 169 has
also been clarified. Any matter admitted is now "conclusively established"
with respect to the party making the admission, unless the trial court on
motion permits a withdrawal or amendment of the admission.'
Deposition practice has been streamlined to permit a party in his notice
to name a corporation or association and describe with reasonable particularity
the matters on which examination is sought." The burden then shifts to the
corporation or association being deposed to designate one or more representa-
tives to appear and testify to the matters specified. It should also be noted
that a party taking a deposition now has an obligation to give prompt notice
of its filing to all other parties.'
Under the amended rules, substitution of parties no longer affects the right
to use depositions previously taken." Similarly, when a suit has been dis-
missed and another suit involving the same subject matter is subsequently
commenced between the same parties or their successors in interest, all depo-
sitions duly taken and filed in the earlier suit may be used in the later suit. 8
Rule 215b,5" which is completely new, authorizes the trial court to award a
12 TEX. R. Civ. P. 168. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (A), 26(e), 33.
51TEx. R. Civ. P. 169.
'4 See FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
51TEX. R. Civ. P. 189, 200; see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) (6).
-1TEX. R. Civ. P. 198, 208.
57 Id. 213 (2).
58 id.
59 /d. 215b. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
[Vol. 27
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party his reasonable expenses in attending an oral deposition when the party
scheduling the deposition fails to attend and proceed with the deposition.
VII. DISMISSAL
It is well settled in Texas that a nunc pro tunc order may be entered at
any time by the trial court to correct a "clerical error" in an earlier judgment."
Since "judicial error" in a judgment is not subject to correction after the
expiration of thirty days from its entry, the Texas courts are frequently called
upon to distinguish between the two." In Universal Underwriters Insurance
Co. v.. Ferguson"' the supreme court considered whether an order correcting
a dismissal for want of prosecution was prompted by clerical or judicial error.
The trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's suit for want of prosecution after
his counsel had failed to appear for a call of the docket. Due to an over-
sight, the notice of the docket call had listed the defendant's attorney as
counsel for plaintiff, and plaintiff's counsel never received notification. The
plaintiff filed a motion for a nunc pro tune order setting aside the dismissal,
contending that the trial court had not intended to dismiss a suit in which
notice had not been properly sent due to clerical error. The defendant opposed
the motion on the grounds that the mistake was judicial error and that, since
thirty days had transpired after entry of the dismissal, the trial court was with-
out jurisdiction to set it aside. The trial court entered an order reinstating
the suit and the defendant brought an original mandamus proceeding. Al-
though acknowledging that a clerical mistake caused the entry of the dis-
missal, the supreme court nevertheless concluded that rendition of the dis-
missal was a judicial act, since no error was made that prevented the dismissal
as entered from reflecting the dismissal as rendered. Since the statute of limita-
tions had run, thus precluding the institution of a new suit, the plaintiff was
left with no procedure to obtain reinstatement of his action except through a
bill of review proceeding. Where a case is erroneously dismissed without
notice, the exacting nature of a bill of review has resulted in a gamut few
plaintiffs have been able to run."3 The dissent in Ferguson reasoned that
"[elvery mistake in an act, order or procedure is not judicial in nature simply
because it is taken, signed or ordered by a judge.""' Quoting another author,
the dissent concluded that "if the judgment or some provision in it was the
result of inadvertence, as where the court was laboring under a mistake or
misapprehension as to the state of the record or as to some extrinsic fact, but
for which a different judgment would have been rendered, the judgment may
be vacated or may be corrected to correspond with what it would have been
but for the inadvertence or mistake.""
To alleviate the obstacles encountered by the plaintiff in Ferguson, rule
61 See generally 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.08.1 (Elliott rev. 1971).
"1See. e.g., Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1969); Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291,
257 S.W.2d 289 (1953); Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29, 285 S.W. 1079 (1921); Cole-
man v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).
62471 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1971).
6See Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950).
"471 S.W.2d at 32.65Id.; 1 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 146 (5th ed. 1925).
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165a" was recently added to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This new
rule permits a trial court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution upon the
failure of a plaintiff to appear for any hearing or docket call "of which he had
notice." Within thirty days of the entry of the dismissal, the trial court is
required to reinstate the case when "the failure of the party or his attorney
was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to acci-
dent or mistake." When the trial court finds that neither the party nor his
attorney receives notice of the dismissal within twenty days of its entry, the
court may reinstate the case at any time "within thirty days after the party
or his attorney first received either a mailed notice or actual notice, but in no
event later than six months after the date of signing of the order of dismissal."
It has not been clear whether a defendant asserting a motion to dismiss for
want of prosecution must establish an "intent to abandon" on the part of the
plaintiff in order to sustain the motion." The Beaumont court of civil appeals
has concluded that an "intent to abandon" is not a part of the inquiry to be
made by a trial court in passing upon a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecu-
tion; rather, "the sole test is whether the case was prosecuted with due dili-
gence.
VIII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment procedure under rule 166-A " continues to be the sub-
ject of substantial appellate attention. Cowan v. Woodrum,"9 a case involving
a somewhat unusual set of procedural events, reiterates the principle that a
summary judgment cannot be entered in favor of. a party who has not filed
a motion asking for one. The defendant had successfully moved for sum-
mary judgment in the trial court. Although the plaintiff had opposed the de-
fendant's motion, he did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment.
Nevertheless, on appeal, the court reversed the order granting defendant's
motion and rendered judgment for the plaintiff on all issues except the dam-
ages issue."' In reversing the judgment in the plaintiff's favor, the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff had filed no motion under rule
166-A and, thus, judgment could not be entered in his favor.
In Lowe v. Employers Casualty Co."2 the court held that an unresponsive
answer to a request for admission is not binding on the party making the
request and cannot be used by the party giving such answer as evidence in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Similarly, a party's answer
to an interrogatory cannot be used by him in support of a motion for summary
judgment. 3
69 TEx. R. Civ. P. 165a; see FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
67Compare Loftus v. Beckmann, 1 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928), judgment
adopted, with Craig v. State, 433 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968), error ref.
n.r.e., and Johnson v. Campbell, 154 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941).
"9 Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Liberty County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 6, 483
S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e.69TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
70472 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1971).
"' Woodrum v. Cowan, 468 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd, 472 S.W.2d
749 (Tex. 1971).
72479 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972).




Article 2226,"* which authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees in specified
cases, was amended in 1971 to provide that "[tlhe amount prescribed in the
current State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule shall be prima facie evidence of
reasonable attorney's fees," and that "[the court, in non-jury cases, may take
judicial knowledge of such schedule and of the contents of the case file in
determining the amount of attorney's fees without the necessity of hearing
further evidence." Prior to this amendment, it was well settled that the rea-
sonableness of an attorney's fee-an issue of fact--could only be established
by opinion evidence, and that opinion adduced by affidavit on a motion for
summary judgment was insufficient to establish such fact as a matter of law.'
During the past year a conflict developed in the decisions of the courts of civil
appeals concerning the effect of the amended article 2226 in a summary judg-
ment proceeding. One court, in Duncan v. Butterowe, Inc.,"4 concluded that
the "prima facie evidence" of a reasonable attorney's fee established by the
fee schedule was insufficient to sustain the burden of a movant under rule
166-A with respect to the reasonableness issue. In contrast are McDonald v.
Newlywed's, Inc." and Superior Stationers Corp. v. Berol Corp.," both of
which concluded that the prima facie effect of the fee schedule was, in the
absence of opposing evidence, sufficient to entitle a party to a summary judg-
ment as to a reasonable attorney's fee. The latter view is the more logical
and would appear to be more in harmony with the intentions of the draftsmen
of amended article 2226.
IX. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe,"9 substan-
tially simplified the submission of special issues in a conventional occupier-
invitee case. The changes resulting from this decision fell into three categories.
First, the court held that the plaintiff-invitee must make prima facie proof
that he did not know of and did not appreciate the danger, and that he was
not charged in law with knowledge and appreciation of the danger. Upon
such a showing, the invitee will be entitled to go to the jury on the issue of
the defendant-occupier's negligence.' The plaintiff-invitee is no longer re-
quired to obtain findings that he did not actually know of and did not appre-
ciate the danger."
1
4 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972).
" See, e.g., Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970); Lancaster
v. Wynnewood State Bank, 470 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971). But see Bagby
Land & Cattle Co. v. California Livestock Comm'n Co., 439 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1971).
76474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1971).
7483 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
78483 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1972).
79483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972).
"
0 According to the supreme court, the plaintiff-invitee in the conventional case will now
only have to obtain findings as to (1) whether the defendant-occupier created a dangerous
condition on his premises, (2) whether the defendant knew or should have known of the
condition, (3) whether the defendant was negligent in some particular respect, and (4)
whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Id. at
458 n.2.
1 Previously, a plaintiff-invitee was required, as an element of his cause of action, to
obtain findings that he did not have actual knowledge of the condition and did not fully
appreciate the nature and extent of the danger. Id. at 458 n.1.
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Second, the defendant-occupier who pleads voluntary assumption of the
risk will only be entitled to a single issue inquiring about the plaintiff-
invitee's knowledge and appreciation."
Third, no issue should be submitted to the jury which inquires whether a
condition is open and obvious. Under the court's holding, a condition can be
open and obvious only when the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that
the invitee had knowledge and full appreciation of the danger.
Two additional cases which may be of interest to the trial lawyer are Del
Bosque v. Heitmann Bering-Cortes Co." and Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains
Textiles, Inc.4 To avoid the frustration of conflicting jury answers, the supreme
court in Del Bosque reiterated that the question of sudden emergency should
be submitted to the jury in the form of an explanatory instruction rather than
a separate special issue. Metal Structures emphasizes the need to submit re-
quested issues and instructions separately to the trial court. Observing that the
defendant had submitted his requested issues and instructions in bulk form in
one instrument, intermingled in such a way as to be confusing, the court
held that the requests were legally insufficient to constitute a basis for appeal.
X. JURY PRACTICE
The most significant development in jury procedures came in the form of
a recent amendment to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 292' now
provides that a verdict may be rendered in the district court by ten members
of the original jury of twelve, and in the county court by five members of an
original jury of six. Any verdict rendered by less than the original twelve
or six jurors, however, must be signed by each juror concurring in the verdict.
It should be noted, however, that rule 292 permits a verdict by less than a
unanimous jury only when the same jurors concur in the answers to all the
issues.
Noteworthy developments in the selection, qualifications, and exemptions
of persons subject to jury service were the result of statutory enactments."
The voter registration lists of a county now constitute the "sole and mandatory
source" of names for the jury wheel."' However, persons under twenty-one
years of age may still not serve on juries."
82 The following issue and accompanying instruction were suggested by the supreme
court:
Did plaintiff voluntarily assume the risk of (stating it)?
You are instructed that in order for the plaintiff (naming), to assume the
risk, she must have actually known of the condition which caused her injury
and she also must have actually and fully appreciated the nature and extent
of the danger involved in encountering the condition, and she must have
voluntarily and of her own free will encountered the danger of the condition
causing her injuries, if any.
Id. at 458 n.2.
83474 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1971); accord, Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.
1971). See generally Comment, Toward a More Simplified Special Issue System, 3 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 79 (1971).
"4470 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
85 Tax. R. Civ. P. 292. See also id. 226a.
86TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2094-96, 2099-2101, 2103a, 2118, 2120-22, 2133,
2135, 2137 (Supp. 1972).
87 Id. art. 2094.
"Id. art. 2133. See also OP. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. M-911 (1972).
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Insofar as qualifications are concerned, the requirement that a juror be
either a freeholder in the state or a householder in the county or wife of a
householder in the county has been eliminated."9 Exemptions from jury service
are now automatically extended only to persons over sixty-five years of age
and females who have legal custody of a child under the age of ten years."
Rule 223, which governs the selection of the general jury panel in coun-
ties having interchangeable juries, requires that "the names of the jurors shall
be placed upon the general panel in the order in which they are drawn from
the wheel."'" Noting that rule 223 was designed to insure a random selec-
tion of jurors, the Texas Supreme Court, in Rivas v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.," concluded that there was substantial compliance with the requirements
when a general jury panel was listed in the order in which the bailiff collected
the letters of summons from the prospective jurors.
Maintaining the lines of communication between a deliberating jury and
the trial court established by rule 285," the court in Logan v. Grady con-
cluded that prejudicial error resulted from the failure of the jury bailiff to
make known to the trial court the jury's request for the testimony of a partic-
ular witness. The appellate court also found that rule 283' had been violated,
since the jury bailiff responded to the request by advising the jury that they
had everything they needed.
Adding to an existing conflict in the decisions of the courts of civil appeals,"
the court in A. J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood" concluded that it was preju-
dicial error for the plaintiff's counsel to ask the jury panel on voir dire exami-
nation whether any of them were engaged in adjusting claims, had written
any insurance, or were connected with the insurance industry. Nevertheless, the
right of a party to the selection of a fair and impartial jury would seem to far
outweigh the possible effect of a good faith inquiry into significant connections
with the insurance industry."
In a case of first impression, a final argument by counsel that a recovery
of workmen's compensation would result in increased insurance premiums
being passed on to the consumer was condemned by the court of civil appeals
in Waddell v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co." because it improperly appealed
to the self-interest of the jurors.
19 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2133 (Supp. 1972).
"Id. art. 2135.
91 TEX. R. Civ. P. 223.
"-480 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1972). See generally 50 TEXAs L. REV. 198 (1971).
9"TEx. R. Civ. P. 285.
14482 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972).
91 TEX. R. CIV. P. 283.
" Compare Kollmorgan v. Scott, 447 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1969); Kinghan Messenger & Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Daniels, 435 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968); South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison,
421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967), error ref. n.r.e.; with Brockett v. Tice,
445 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969), error ref. n.r.e. See also
Johnson v. Reed, 464 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
97474 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
"See, e.g., Braman v. Wiley, 119 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1941); Bass v. Dehner, 103 F.2d
28 (10th Cir. 1939); Martin v. Burgess, 82 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1936); Eppinger & Russell
Co. v. Sheely, 24 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1928); South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison,
421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
99473 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971).
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XI. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The attorney who sometimes finds himself short on time will be relieved
to know that one court of civil appeals has concluded that a telegram to the
trial court from a party against whom a summary judgment had been entered,
requesting that the judgment be set aside, was sufficient as a motion for new
trial.'" A later, formal motion reduced the motion to more conventional form.
The case of Roberts v. K-Mart Foods, Inc."' is a warning that a motion
for new trial stating only that the trial court "erred in failing to submit and
in rejecting the proposed instructions and special issues . . .on file with the
records of this case" does not comply with rule 320, 2 which requires that
each ground on which the motion is founded be specified. The court of appeals
reasoned that if this type of a motion for new trial were countenanced, the
trial court would be compelled to sift through a multitude of requested issues
and instructions to ascertain which had been included in the charge given, and
which of such requests, if any, had merit.
In Draper v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co."03 rule 329b, which provides
that "[nJot more than one amended motion for new trial may be filed,"'10
was interpreted to preclude a movant from supplementing an amended mo-
tion for new trial by adding a new and previously unstated ground for a new
trial.
XII. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The most significant decision during the survey period dealing with ap-
pellate procedure was Webb v. Jorns, 0 5 which was concerned with both the
finality of a judgment and the sufficiency of a notice of appeal. The plaintiff
brought suit against several defendants as joint tortfeasors. The first defendant
was dismissed from the case three months before trial. At the conclusion of
the evidence adduced at the trial, the trial court rendered judgment that the
plaintiff take nothing from the remaining defendants. The judgment, how-
ever, made no mention of the first defendant or his earlier dismissal. Con-
tradicting several earlier Texas cases,' the court of civil appeals sensibly
concluded that there was a final judgment, since the dismissal of the first
defendant was made final by implication when the take nothing judgment
was rendered against the remaining defendants."' On review the supreme
court agreed with this result.
Webb also considered the proper method of giving notice of appeal in a
multiple disposition case. Despite its conclusion that the earlier dismissal was
'Solar v. Petersson, 481 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.1 1972).
101470 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
102 TEx. R. CIV. P. 320.
103 484 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972).
101TEx. R. CIv. P. 329b.
1- 488 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1972), rev'g 473 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1971).
'0' Schell v. Centex Materials Co., 450 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970);
Thomas v. Shult, 436 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968); Everett
v. Humble Employees West Texas Fed. Credit Union, 377 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1964); Sisttie v. Holland, 374 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964).107473 S.W.2d at 332.
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brought forward and by implication made a part of the later decree, the court of
civil appeals held that the plaintiff failed to give notice of appeal with respect
to the order dismissing the first defendant because the only notice given re-
lated to and was incorporated in the later judgment."8 It is difficult to see how
the earlier dismissal was brought forward and by implication made a part of
the later judgment for purposes of finality, but not for purposes of the giving
of a notice of appeal. For this reason, the supreme court concluded the notice
of appeal was sufficient as to both rulings.
An unusual situation was presented in Waller v. O'Rear.' The appellant
was unable to file a statement of facts in the court of civil appeals because
the court reporter misplaced his notes of the trial and was unable to locate
them. In granting the appellant's motion to reverse and remand the case for
a new trial, the court of civil appeals concluded that "Itihe appealing party is
entitled to a statement of facts in question and answer form, and if, through
no fault of his own, after the exercise of due diligence, he is unable to pro-
cure such a statement of facts, his right to have the cause reviewed on appeal
can be preserved to him in no other way than by a retrial of the case."" 0
Texas & Pacific Railway v. Roberts"' confirms the principle that a Texas
appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a case brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act must adhere to the federal rule,
which requires only that the verdict be supported by "some evidence about
which reasonable minds could differ."
1 2
The recent amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have also
had an impact on appellate practice. In an effort to reduce the size and cost of
the record on appeal, rule 376a"8 was modified to exclude trial briefs and
memoranda from inclusion in the transcript.
Additionally, to expedite the disposition of certain cases, the supreme court
has been given the discretion to revise, reform, or modify the judgment of
the court of civil appeals upon granting writ of error. This may be done with-
out hearing argument in cases where the decision of the court of civil appeals
is in conflict with a previous opinion of the supreme court, or is contrary to
the constitution, the statutes, or the rules of civil procedure."'
One other change should be noted by the appellate practitioner. When a
final judgment is rendered in the court of civil appeals or the supreme court,
the clerk of the court is required to issue the mandate to the lower court
without any further payment of costs, except that no mandate will be issued
when it is requested by a party against whom any of the costs of the appeal
have been taxed and who has not made payment."'
108 Id.
1"9472 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
"'Id. at 790.
M 481 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1972).
I" Id. at 800, citing Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Dice v. Akron,
C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Western & A.R.R. v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496 (1928).
"I TEX. R. Civ. P. 376a.
"
4 Id. 483.




Of great importance with respect to prejudgment remedies is the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes v., Shevin."'1 Under considera-
tion in Fuentes were the statutes of the states of Florida and Pennsylvania
authorizing the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person's possession
under a writ of replevin. Both statutes permitted the issuance of writs ordering
state agents to seize a person's possessions upon ex parte application and
without notice or opportunity to challenge the seizure at a prior hearing.
In invalidating the remedies under consideration, the Supreme Court concluded
that "the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions work a
deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny the
right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their
possessor.""'
Since the Texas statutes authorizing initiation of the prejudgment remedies
of attachment," ' garnishment,"" and sequestration'" suffer from the same de-
fect as the replevin provisions considered in Fuentes, the procedures under
those statutes probably do not meet the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment."'
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
Despite the provisions of article 2558a,'" which authorize the county to
receive the interest on funds deposited in the registry of the trial court in an
interpleader action, the Texas Supreme Court has held that such interest be-
longs to the party who is found to be the owner of the funds." Any other re-
sult, reasoned the court, would offend the Texas'" and United States Constitu-
tions,'" as the owner would be deprived of a sum not reasonably related to
the value of the county's services in safekeeping the principal.
116407 U.S. 67 (1972).
"I Id. at 96.
118TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 275-82, 288, 290, 300 (1959). See also TEX. R.
Civ. P. 592-99, 606.
""TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4076, 4084 (1966). See also TEX. R. Civ. P.
657-63.
t"0 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960). See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 696-708.
121 The Massachusetts attachment statute has been held unconstitutional. Schneider v.
Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972). But see Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick,
323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971).
Arizona garnishment statutes have been held to violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 344 F. Supp. 1136 (D. Ariz. 1972);
cf. Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Lebowitz v. Forbes Leas-
ing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See generally Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Provisions of New York sequestration statutes have been held to violate search and
seizure provisions of the fourth amendment as made applicable to the states under the four-
teenth amendment. Se Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.
1970); cf. Hall v. Garson, No. 72-1189 (5th Cir., Nov. 2, 1972); Adams v. Egley, 338
F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). But see Gordon v. Michel, 297 A.2d 420 (Del. Ch. 1972);
Cf. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
"12 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2558a (1956).
123Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1972).
"4 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
12- U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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"Material furnished," as that term is used in article 2226,' T has been con-
strued by the supreme court to include water control gates supplied to the
prime contractor of a dam, thereby authorizing the recovery of a reasonable
attorney's fee in a suit by the supplier of the gates for their purchase price."
1"TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972).
127 Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. Trinity Constr. Co., 481 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. 1972).
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